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Japan wants US Steel. Washington may say no

An Airlinair ATR 42 used by Airbus as a staff shuttle between factories.
An Airlinair ATR 42 used by Airbus as a staff shuttle between factories. Photo: Ken Fielding/Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 3.0

Nippon Steel has offered $14.9 billion for US Steel, or $55 a share, a forty per cent premium that the industrial logic can easily justify. The Japanese company would gain a sizeable foothold in America's protected steel market. US Steel shareholders would get a generous cash exit from a business that has been starved of investment for years. The trouble is that the bid lands in an election year.

An auction with a rival bidder

The sale did not come out of nowhere. In August US Steel rejected an unsolicited cash-and-stock offer from Cleveland-Cliffs, its domestic rival, worth $35 a share when it was made, and then put itself up for sale. Cliffs had the backing of the United Steelworkers. Nippon Steel's all-cash offer beat that price comfortably, and the Japanese company has promised to keep US Steel's name and its headquarters in Pittsburgh and to honour its union contracts.

The protection explains the price. Since 2018 imported steel has faced tariffs imposed on national-security grounds under Section 232 of a 1962 trade law, and Japanese mills now ship to America under a quota agreed with Washington in 2022. Buying plants inside the tariff wall is the surest way for a foreign producer to sell into a market where prices sit well above world levels. US Steel also brings Big River Steel, a modern electric-arc mill in Arkansas that it bought outright in 2021, which gives Nippon Steel a low-cost base for the sheet steel that carmakers use.

Politics widens the spread

The United Steelworkers union opposes the deal, and politicians from both parties in Washington have lined up to condemn it, turning an ordinary takeover into a geopolitical row. Those calling on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to block it on national security grounds are overlooking the fact that Japan is America's closest ally in Asia. The noise adds a large risk of collapse to the arbitrage spread.

Marunouchi Central Plaza, with the red-brick Tokyo Station and the Shin-Marunouchi Building at left, on a sunny afternoon.
Marunouchi Central Plaza, with the red-brick Tokyo Station and the Shin-Marunouchi Building at left, on a sunny afternoon. Photo: Basile Morin/Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0

The critics span the spectrum, from Republican senators such as JD Vance and Marco Rubio to Democrats such as Sherrod Brown and John Fetterman. On Thursday Lael Brainard, the White House's top economic adviser, said the purchase deserved serious scrutiny for its effect on national security and supply chains. Pennsylvania, home to US Steel's headquarters and its Mon Valley mills, is among the handful of states likely to decide next year's presidential election. No candidate wants to be seen waving through the sale of a company J.P. Morgan and Andrew Carnegie's fortune created in 1901.

How the review works

CFIUS is an inter-agency panel chaired by the Treasury secretary. By statute it has 45 days to review a filing and a further 45 days to investigate, which can be extended, after which a deal it considers dangerous goes to the president, who has 15 days to decide. Parties often withdraw and refile to buy time, so the clock can run far longer than the headline timetable suggests. The committee can also clear a deal on conditions, such as commitments on production, investment or who sits on the board, which is the most likely route for a buyer from an allied country.

The union has its own lever. The United Steelworkers argues that its contract with US Steel gives it a say over any change of ownership, and its opposition feeds directly into the political pressure on the White House. A president who has courted organised labour, facing a close race in the industrial Midwest, would find it awkward to approve a deal the steelworkers are campaigning against.

Precedents are not encouraging

Washington has blocked or scared off friendly buyers before. In 1987 Fujitsu abandoned a plan to buy Fairchild Semiconductor after opposition from the Reagan administration, at the height of American anxiety about Japanese competition. The episode helped prompt the Exon-Florio amendment of 1988, which gave the president the power to block foreign takeovers on security grounds. In 2006 Dubai Ports World bowed to a congressional revolt and sold the American port operations it had acquired, even though CFIUS had cleared the deal. In 2018 Donald Trump used his power to stop Broadcom, then based in Singapore, from buying Qualcomm. Formal security review is one hurdle, and political theatre in an election year is a separate and higher one.

Kamijinko at Tōshō-gū, Nikko, seen from the southwest.
Kamijinko at Tōshō-gū, Nikko, seen from the southwest. Photo: DXR/Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0

The case for a deal

The argument that the deal survives is respectable. CFIUS rules on national security rather than votes, and it has approved many Japanese purchases of American companies; a treaty ally buying a steelmaker whose main customers are carmakers, appliance makers and builders makes a thin security case. Nippon Steel has also agreed to pay a break fee of $565 million if regulators stop the deal, a sign that it expects to win. The review can nonetheless run for months, the final decision rests with the president, and the calendar puts that decision uncomfortably close to polling day.

Who wins if it fails

If the deal collapses, US Steel's shareholders lose most of the premium, and Cleveland-Cliffs becomes the obvious fallback buyer at a lower price, which would also hand the union the owner it wanted. Arbitrageurs who bought the shares after the announcement would take the loss in between. That asymmetry is why US Steel's shares have traded well below the offer price since the bid was announced.

The arithmetic of the spread is simple. An arbitrageur buying below $55 earns the gap if the deal closes, but risks a fall towards the price that would prevail without a bid, and the longer the review drags on, the lower the annual return on the capital tied up. A combination with Cliffs would also run into antitrust questions, since it would merge two of the biggest American producers of the flat-rolled steel sold to carmakers, so even the fallback is not assured.

Merger arbitrageurs should expect a wide spread and a long wait. Washington looks ready to sacrifice shareholder value and strain relations with a close ally to win votes in an election year, and US Steel's investors are the likeliest losers. The most probable outcome is a review that drags past November's election, with the shares stuck well below $55 until then and a real chance that the deal dies in the Oval Office.

Write to Arnav Goel at contact@thelombardreview.com

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