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The Treasury needs more money, and companies will feel it

Pennsylvania Avenue, looking west toward the Post Office Building.
Pennsylvania Avenue, looking west toward the Post Office Building. Photo: Chris Light/Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0

On 2 August the US Treasury raised its quarterly refunding to $103 billion, the first increase in coupon issuance since 2021. Washington's borrowing is speeding up and companies are about to feel the draught. The years of gentle supply of long-dated debt are over. To fund widening deficits, the government has to sell much more paper at the long end of the curve.

How the supply built up

The increase did not come out of nowhere. For most of the past two years the Treasury held coupon auction sizes steady and met its needs with bills, a choice that suited a market still digesting pandemic-era issuance. The debt-ceiling standoff in the spring froze net borrowing altogether, and once the ceiling was suspended in early June the Treasury rushed to rebuild its cash balance with a wave of bill sales. Bills can carry the load for a while, but not indefinitely without the share of short-term debt drifting well beyond the Treasury's own comfort zone.

The refunding statement was blunt about what comes next. Officials said further gradual increases would probably be needed in future quarters, which means the $103 billion is a step on a staircase rather than a landing. Two days earlier the Treasury had told markets it expected to borrow about $1 trillion in the July-to-September quarter, a larger sum than dealers had pencilled in. Fitch's downgrade of the United States on 1 August then drew attention to the same arithmetic from a different angle.

Duration has to find a home

The real burden of long-dated issuance is duration, the sensitivity of a bond's price to changes in yields. A ten-year or thirty-year note exposes its holder to far more interest-rate risk than a three-month bill, and the market's appetite for that risk is finite. When the government adds more of it, somebody has to be paid to hold it, and the payment takes the form of a higher term premium on long yields.

The usual buyers are thinner on the ground than they were. The Federal Reserve is shrinking its balance sheet, letting up to $60 billion of Treasuries a month roll off without replacement, so the biggest buyer of the past decade has become a net seller in effect. Japanese investors, long a reliable source of demand, have fresh reasons to stay at home after the Bank of Japan loosened its grip on domestic ten-year yields at the end of July. Banks, still nursing losses on securities bought when yields were low, are in no hurry to add more after the failure of Silicon Valley Bank in March.

Companies pick up the bill

The flood of new Treasuries arrives just as corporate treasurers prepare to refinance large chunks of debt taken on after the pandemic. Benchmark Treasury yields are rising to absorb the supply, so either investment-grade spreads widen or base rates climb. The government borrows whatever the price and in effect sets the clearing rate. Corporate issuers are left to pay the higher cost of capital.

The Deutsche Bank high-rise, seen from Opernplatz.
The Deutsche Bank high-rise, seen from Opernplatz. Photo: Leonhard Lenz/Wikimedia Commons · CC0

The transmission is mechanical. An investment-grade bond is priced as a spread over the Treasury of similar maturity, so a company issuing ten-year debt pays the ten-year Treasury yield plus whatever premium investors demand for its credit risk. If the Treasury yield rises and the spread holds, the company pays more. If investors, faced with a better-yielding government alternative, demand a wider spread as well, it pays more twice over.

The companies most exposed are those that borrowed long and cheaply in 2020 and 2021 and must now roll that debt into a market where all-in yields are several percentage points higher. Utilities, telecoms groups and property companies, which finance long-lived assets with long-dated debt, sit at the front of the queue. Lower-rated borrowers have the least room to absorb the extra cost, and many can shorten maturities only by accepting refinancing risk sooner.

Winners from the glut

Not everyone loses. Savers and money-market funds collect the highest yields on cash in more than fifteen years, with the Fed's policy rate now at 5.25 to 5.5 per cent after its July rise. Insurers and pension funds that match long-dated liabilities can lock in yields that were unavailable for most of the past decade. Defined-benefit schemes whose funding positions have improved as discount rates rose are natural buyers of long bonds, and their demand will absorb some of the new supply.

There is also an argument that companies have seen this coming. Many extended their maturities during the years of cheap money, so the refinancing wall is spread over several years rather than concentrated in the next few months. Corporate bond issuance has been subdued this year precisely because treasurers with cash and long-dated debt can wait. Investment-grade spreads have stayed fairly tight, which suggests investors are not yet demanding extra compensation for credit risk.

Why the squeeze still bites

That defence holds for strong balance sheets, but it describes a delay rather than an escape. Waiting works only if yields fall before the debt comes due, and a rising stream of Treasury coupons makes that outcome less likely. Tight spreads matter less than they appear, because the cost that has risen is the base rate itself. A company paying the same spread over a ten-year yield that has more than doubled in two years still faces a much larger interest bill.

The next refunding announcement, due in early November, will show how steep the staircase is. The signs to watch before then are auction results, in particular how much of each long-dated sale falls to dealers because end investors did not take it, and whether the Treasury leans harder on bills to spare the long end. A sustained rise in the term premium would be the clearest evidence that the market is charging for duration rather than for expected policy rates.

The bigger refunding brings crowding out back. As the Treasury sells more long debt through the rest of the year, every company that needs to borrow will pay more for the privilege, and the heaviest bills will land on lower-rated, long-duration issuers that have to refinance before the end of next year.

Write to Arnav Goel at contact@thelombardreview.com

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