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China's cheap EVs meet Europe's tariffs

A container crane at the Port of Rotterdam.
A container crane at the Port of Rotterdam. Photo: Guilhem Vellut/Wikimedia Commons · CC BY 2.0

The European Commission has imposed provisional countervailing duties of up to 38.1 per cent on battery electric vehicles (EVs) imported from China. Brussels concluded that heavy state subsidies along China's supply chain let its carmakers sell in Europe at artificially low prices, putting European factories at risk.

Nine months of investigation

The case began last September, when Ursula von der Leyen announced an anti-subsidy inquiry in her annual address to the European Parliament, and the formal investigation opened in October. The Commission's findings pointed to cheap land, state-directed lending, subsidised batteries and generous purchase incentives at home that had helped Chinese firms build capacity far beyond domestic demand. The rates vary by company: BYD, which cooperated fully, faces 17.4 per cent, Geely 20 per cent, and SAIC, the state-owned group behind the MG brand, the top rate. All come on top of the existing 10 per cent import tariff on cars. The scale of the competitive threat is plain from BYD alone, which overtook Tesla as the world's largest seller of battery electric cars in the final quarter of last year.

The duties are provisional and are due to apply from early July, with a final decision needed by November. That leaves several months for negotiation, and Beijing and Brussels have both said they are open to talks. A common outcome in trade cases of this kind is a price undertaking, under which exporters agree to sell above a minimum price in exchange for relief from the duties.

Protection with a price

The tariffs give European carmakers some temporary cover, but they invite retaliation against German luxury exports to China. Chinese manufacturers also have such a lead in battery chemistry and automated assembly that even a forty-per-cent tariff may not erase their price advantage in the showroom. Protection can slow the disruption. It cannot make European plants more efficient.

The Banque de France building in Annecy.
The Banque de France building in Annecy. Photo: Kenyh/Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 3.0

The retaliation has already begun to take shape. China opened an anti-dumping investigation into European brandy in January, a move aimed squarely at France, one of the loudest supporters of the probe, and it has since started an inquiry into imports of European pork. German carmakers, which sell a large share of their output in China and build many cars there, lobbied openly against the duties. They fear that Beijing's next target could be large-engined petrol cars, the segment where European brands still earn the highest margins.

Who gains and who pays

The clearest winners are European volume brands competing at the cheaper end of the market, where Chinese models posed the most direct threat. The losers include European consumers, who will pay more for electric cars at a time when governments want them to switch, and the EU's own climate targets, which depend on rapid take-up. Some Western brands are caught too, since BMW, Tesla and others ship cars to Europe from Chinese factories and will pay duties on them.

Chinese firms have several ways around the wall. The duties apply to battery electric cars, so exporters can shift towards plug-in hybrids, which are not covered. They can also build in Europe: BYD announced a plant in Hungary last December, and others are scouting sites. Local assembly would bring jobs, but it would also embed Chinese competitors inside the single market, where tariffs no longer apply.

Lessons from solar and Japan

Europe has tried this before. In 2013 it imposed duties on Chinese solar panels and then agreed a minimum-price deal with exporters. The measures did not save most European panel makers, which went on shrinking, and they raised costs for the installers and households that were supposed to benefit from cheap solar. Brussels let the measures lapse in 2018, by which time China's dominance of the industry was near complete.

Xinsha Road in Futian, Shenzhen.
Xinsha Road in Futian, Shenzhen. Photo: Dinkun Chen/Wikimedia Commons · CC BY-SA 4.0

The American experience with Japanese carmakers in the 1980s offers a different lesson. Export restraints agreed in 1981 limited the number of Japanese cars shipped to the United States, and Japanese firms responded by building factories in America and moving upmarket into more profitable models. Detroit gained breathing space but not a durable advantage, and the Japanese transplants became some of the most productive car plants in the country. The protection changed where the cars were made, not who made the best ones.

The case for the duties

The strongest argument in Brussels's favour is that the alternative was worse. Chinese carmakers have capacity to build far more vehicles than their home market can absorb, and price wars at home have pushed them to export aggressively. The United States has already raised its tariff on Chinese EVs to 100 per cent, which risks diverting even more of that surplus towards Europe. Measured duties, set company by company after an investigation, look moderate by comparison and keep the door open to negotiation.

That argument justifies the duties as a holding measure. It does not answer the question of what European carmakers will do with the time. Battery costs make up a large share of an electric car's price, and Chinese firms control much of the supply chain from refining to cell production. Closing that gap requires investment on a scale that Europe's battery start-ups have so far struggled to finance.

What decides the outcome

The dates to watch are the start of provisional collection in early July, the vote by member states on definitive duties in the autumn, and any sign of a price undertaking. Germany's position in that vote matters most, given its exposure to retaliation. Registrations of Chinese-made hybrids in Europe over the next few quarters will show how quickly exporters find a way around the rules.

The duties will probably shield Europe's established carmakers for a few years at most, and German exporters may pay for them in China. Tariffs cannot make up for a decade of falling behind, and unless Europe closes the cost gap, they will only have delayed the reckoning. By the time the first Chinese plants in Hungary are producing, the tariff wall will matter less than whether European firms have used the interval to build cheaper cars of their own.

Write to Arnav Goel at contact@thelombardreview.com

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